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Full Idea
If we imagine a possible world in which two clocks in a room make one clock from half the parts of each, the judgement 'these two actual clocks could have been a single clock' does not seem wholly false.
Gist of Idea
If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock.
Source
Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 7.4)
Book Ref
Forbes,Graeme: 'The Metaphysics of Modality' [OUP 1985], p.179
A Reaction
You would, of course, have sufficient parts left over to make a second clock, so they look like a destroyed clock, so I don't think I find Forbes's intuition on this one very persuasive.
| 16796 | Locke may accept coinciding material substances, such as body, man and person [Locke, by Pasnau] |
| 12970 | We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to [Leibniz] |
| 14744 | Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees [Wiggins, by Sider] |
| 14750 | Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider] |
| 13401 | The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism [Jubien] |
| 12024 | If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G] |
| 16080 | Is it possible for two things that are identical to become two separate things? [Rudder Baker] |
| 13918 | Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe] |
| 14743 | The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities [Sider] |
| 12820 | Without extensional mereology two objects can occupy the same position [Simons] |