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Single Idea 12026

[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth ]

Full Idea

Putnam presumes it is correct to say that ice and steam are forms of water, rather than that ice, water and steam are three forms of H2O. If we allow the latter, then 'water is H2O' is not an identity, but elliptical for 'water is H2O in liquid state'.

Gist of Idea

We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O

Source

comment on Hilary Putnam (The Meaning of 'Meaning' [1975]) by Graeme Forbes - The Metaphysics of Modality 8.2

Book Ref

Forbes,Graeme: 'The Metaphysics of Modality' [OUP 1985], p.196


A Reaction

This nice observation seems to reveal that the word 'water' is ambiguous. I presume the ambiguity preceded the discovery of its chemical construction. Shakespeare would have hesitated over whether to say 'water is ice'. Context would matter.


The 20 ideas with the same theme [we may not know what we mean by 'water']:

If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Putnam, by Crane]
We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O [Forbes,G on Putnam]
Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Putnam, by Rey]
'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this [Putnam]
Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam]
Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson]
Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds [Kim]
Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour [Kim]
What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori [Harré/Madden]
XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor]
If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor]
Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré]
The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane]
Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe]
If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
That water is essentially H2O in some way concerns how we use 'water' [Sidelle]
Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin [Schroeter]
Water must be related to water, just as tigers must be related to tigers [Almog]