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Single Idea 12031

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties ]

Full Idea

Essences have normally been understood to be constituted by qualitative properties.

Gist of Idea

Essences are taken to be qualitative properties

Source

Robert Merrihew Adams (Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity [1979], 1)

Book Ref

'Metaphysics - An Anthology', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Kim,J. [Blackwell 1999], p.172


A Reaction

I add this simple point, because it might be challenged by the view that an essence is a substance, rather than the properties of anything. I prefer that, and would add that substances are individuated by distinctive causal powers.


The 13 ideas from Robert Merrihew Adams

Adams says actual things have haecceities, but not things that only might exist [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker]
Possible worlds are world-stories, maximal descriptions of whole non-existent worlds [Adams,RM, by Molnar]
Adams says anti-haecceitism reduces all thisness to suchness [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker]
Haecceitism may or may not involve some logical connection to essence [Adams,RM, by Mackie,P]
Are possible worlds just qualities, or do they include primitive identities as well? [Adams,RM]
A 'thisness' is a thing's property of being identical with itself (not the possession of self-identity) [Adams,RM]
Essences are taken to be qualitative properties [Adams,RM]
Direct reference is by proper names, or indexicals, or referential uses of descriptions [Adams,RM]
If the universe was cyclical, totally indiscernible events might occur from time to time [Adams,RM]
Two events might be indiscernible yet distinct, if there was a universe cyclical in time [Adams,RM]
Black's two globes might be one globe in highly curved space [Adams,RM]
Moderate Haecceitism says transworld identities are primitive, but connected to qualities [Adams,RM]
There are cases where mere qualities would not ensure an intrinsic identity [Adams,RM]