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Single Idea 12048

[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique ]

Full Idea

We have no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it.

Gist of Idea

The only meaning we have for substance is a collection of qualities

Source

David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.I.6)

Book Ref

Hume,David: 'A Treatise of Human Nature', ed/tr. Mossner,Ernest C. [Penguin 1969], p.63


A Reaction

This is the standard empiricist view of such things, firmly stated. It is tempting to say that Hume has simply misunderstood the word, since it is precisely intended to mean not the qualities, but what underlies them, and persists.


The 20 ideas with the same theme [objections to the very concept of substances]:

Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi on Descartes]
Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless [Descartes, by Pasnau]
We don't know what substance is, and only vaguely know what it does [Locke]
If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity [Leibniz, by Macdonald,C]
A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley]
The only meaning we have for substance is a collection of qualities [Hume]
Aristotelians propose accidents supported by substance, but they don't understand either of them [Hume]
The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant]
'Substance' is just a word for groupings and structures in experience [James]
An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell]
We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell]
The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell]
We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden]
Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil]
Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg]
A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C]
When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology [Macdonald,C]
Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't [Macdonald,C]
A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle [Macdonald,C]
For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts [Pasnau]