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Single Idea 12075
[filed under theme 2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
]
Full Idea
An Aristotelian definition is causal.
Gist of Idea
An Aristotelian definition is causal
Source
report of Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], Bk II.2) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 1.5
Book Ref
Witt,Charlotte: 'Substance and Essence in Aristotle' [Cornell 1994], p.35
A Reaction
[She refers us to Posterior Analytics II.2] This is important if we are tempted to follow a modern line of saying that we want Aristotelian essences, and that these are definitions. We ain't thinking of dictionaries.
The
25 ideas
with the same theme
[give the true nature of something, not just a description]:
15854
|
A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names
[Plato]
|
10944
|
A definition must be of something primary
[Aristotle]
|
596
|
Only substance [ousias] admits of definition
[Aristotle]
|
12360
|
Definitions need the complex features of form, and don't need to mention the category
[Aristotle, by Wedin]
|
16107
|
Sometimes parts must be mentioned in definitions of essence, and sometimes not
[Aristotle]
|
12145
|
Definitions are of what something is, and that is universal
[Aristotle]
|
12384
|
Definition by division needs predicates, which are well ordered and thorough
[Aristotle]
|
9066
|
You can define objects by progressively identifying what is the same and what is different
[Aristotle]
|
12075
|
An Aristotelian definition is causal
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
8200
|
Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined
[Aristotle, by Quine]
|
15957
|
Essential definitions show the differences that discriminate things, and make them what they are
[Boyle]
|
12976
|
If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions
[Leibniz]
|
12982
|
One essence can be expressed by several definitions
[Leibniz]
|
12984
|
Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities
[Leibniz]
|
12915
|
Definitions can only be real if the item is possible
[Leibniz]
|
11920
|
A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity
[Molnar]
|
11217
|
Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage
[Gupta]
|
12302
|
Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us
[Fine,K]
|
11157
|
Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals
[Fine,K]
|
14259
|
Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms
[Fine,K]
|
9959
|
'Real' definitions give the essential properties of things under a concept
[Mautner]
|
9376
|
A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact
[Boghossian]
|
15118
|
A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation
[Koslicki]
|
17311
|
Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence
[Koslicki]
|
16030
|
'Nominal' definitions identify things, but fail to give their essence
[Jones,J-E]
|