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Single Idea 12093

[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined ]

Full Idea

Aristotle's argument is that if we understand the substance of a thing to be that which unifies it, and if we understand that a universal is predicated of many things, then we will see that a universal cannot be the substance of a thing.

Gist of Idea

Substance is unified and universals are diverse, so universals are not substance

Source

report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1038b1-15) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle

Book Ref

Witt,Charlotte: 'Substance and Essence in Aristotle' [Cornell 1994], p.158


A Reaction

Presumably if universals are predicated of something, or something 'partakes' of the universal, then we want to know about the 'something', not about the universal. But do we end up with substances being 'bare particulars'?


The 37 ideas with the same theme [attempts to define what a substance consists of]:

Democritus said that substances could never be mixed, so atoms are the substances [Democritus, by Aristotle]
Earlier Aristotle had objects as primary substances, but later he switched to substantial form [Aristotle, by Lowe]
Things are called 'substances' because they are subjects for everything else [Aristotle]
Substance [ousia] is the subject of predication and cause [aitia?] of something's existence [Aristotle]
Essence (fixed by definition) is also 'ousia', so 'ousia' is both ultimate subject, and a this-thing [Aristotle]
A substance is what-it-is-to-be, or the universal, or the genus, or the subject of saying [Aristotle]
It is matter that turns out to be substance [ousia] [Aristotle]
Matter is not substance, because substance needs separability and thisness [Aristotle]
The substance is the form dwelling in the object [Aristotle]
Substance is unified and universals are diverse, so universals are not substance [Aristotle, by Witt]
A thing's substance is its primary cause of being [Aristotle]
None of the universals can be a substance [Aristotle]
In Aristotle, 'proté ousia' is 'primary being', and 'to hupokeimenon' is 'that which lies under' (or 'substance') [Aristotle, by Politis]
Substance is distinct being because of its unity [Aristotle, by Witt]
A substance needs nothing else in order to exist [Descartes]
Substance is that of which an independent conception can be formed [Spinoza]
Substance is the power of self-actualisation [Spinoza, by Lord]
We think of substance as experienced qualities plus a presumed substratum of support [Locke]
Substance is that which can act [Leibniz]
Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz]
Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence [Leibniz]
Leibnizian substances add concept, law, force, form and soul [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Substances are essentially active [Leibniz, by Jolley]
There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit [Berkeley]
Material substance is just general existence which can have properties [Berkeley]
All appearances need substance, as that which persists through change [Kant]
Substance must exist, as the persisting substratum of the process of change [Kant]
Substance has to exist, with no intrinsic qualities or relations [McTaggart]
We refer to persisting substances, in perception and in thought, and they aid understanding [Wiggins]
On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects [Lowe]
The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Substance is a principle and a kind of cause [Wedin]
The bundle theory of substance implies the identity of indiscernibles [Macdonald,C]
Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins]
A substance is, roughly, a basic being or subject at the foundation of reality [Robb]
Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant]