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Single Idea 12134

[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object ]

Full Idea

Matter, in the proper sense of the term, is to be identified with the substratum which is receptive of coming-to-be and passing-away; but the substratum of the remaining kinds of change is also matter, because these substrata receive contraries.

Clarification

The substratum [to hupokeimenon] is 'that which lies under' a thing

Gist of Idea

Matter is the substratum, which supports both coming-to-be and alteration

Source

Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 320a03)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'The Basic Works of Aristotle', ed/tr. McKeon,Richard [Modern Library Classics 2001], p.485


A Reaction

This must be compared with his complex discussion of the role of matter in his Metaphysics, where he has introduced 'form' as the essence of things. I don't think the two texts are inconsistent, but it's tricky... See Idea 12133 on types of change.

Related Idea

Idea 12133 If the substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; if it doesn't, it is 'coming-to-be' or 'passing-away' [Aristotle]


The 13 ideas with the same theme [underlying material which is formed into an object]:

Matter is the substratum, which supports both coming-to-be and alteration [Aristotle]
Every distinct thing has matter, as long as it isn't an essence or a Form [Aristotle]
In Aristotle, bronze only becomes 'matter' when it is potentially a statue [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Aristotle's conception of matter applies to non-physical objects as well as physical objects [Aristotle, by Fine,K]
Aristotle's matter is something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour [Aristotle, by Witt]
Matter is secondary, because it is potential, determined by the actuality of form [Aristotle, by Witt]
In feature-generation the matter (such as bronze) endures, but in generation it doesn't [Aristotle, by Politis]
The ultimate material of things has the unity of total formlessness [Avicenna]
The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies [Harré/Madden]
Matter underlies things, composes things, and brings them to be [Wiggins]
I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples' [Inwagen]
Aristotelian matter seriously threatens the intrinsic unity and substantiality of its object [Gill,ML]
The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]