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Single Idea 12135

[filed under theme 9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential ]

Full Idea

If 'beginning of existence' meant 'first moment of existence after a period of nonexistence', then objects with interrupted existence have two beginnings of existence.

Gist of Idea

Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings

Source

Baruch Brody (Identity and Essence [1980], 4.1)

Book Ref

Brody,Baruch: 'Identity and Essence' [Princeton 1980], p.80

A Reaction

One might still maintain that the first beginning was essential to the object, since that is the event that defined it - and that would clarify the reason why we are supposed to think the origins are essential. I say the origin explains it.

The 13 ideas from Baruch Brody

15834 Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P]
11895 A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P]
12141 Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody]
12130 a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody]
12132 Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody]
12135 Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody]
12138 Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation [Brody]
12137 De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody]
12140 Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody]
12139 Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody]
12142 Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody]
12143 An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody]
12144 Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody]