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Single Idea 12153

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity ]

Full Idea

Frege's position is that 'being the same F as' splits up into a general relation and an assertion about the referent ('being the same' and 'being an F'). This is what Geach denies, when he says there is no such thing as being 'just the same'.

Gist of Idea

Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F

Source

comment on Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by John Perry - The Same F I

Book Ref

'Metaphysics - An Anthology', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Kim,J. [Blackwell 1999], p.91

A Reaction

It looks as if you can take your pick - whether two things are perfectly identical, or whether they are identical in some respect. Get an unambiguous proposition before you begin the discussion. Identify referents, not kinds of identity, says Perry.

The 18 ideas with the same theme [identity can only ever be in respect of some feature]:

16794 As an infant, Socrates was not the same body, but he was the same human being [Hobbes]
16795 Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas [Locke]
12153 Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F [Perry on Frege]
17653 Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman]
16075 Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach]
12152 Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach]
17512 If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
13953 An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R]
12155 Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance [Perry]
14362 Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
11838 Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins]
11847 To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins]
14755 Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider]
8305 A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe]
10321 We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion [Hale]
15185 We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it [Sidelle]
4640 If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y') [Baggini /Fosl, by PG]
16074 Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman]