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Single Idea 12155

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity ]

Full Idea

Statements of 'relative' identity are not identity statements at all, but what I would prefer to call 'statements of resemblance' or 'common property staztements'.

Gist of Idea

Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance

Source

John Perry (The Same F [1970], n12)

Book Ref

'Metaphysics - An Anthology', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Kim,J. [Blackwell 1999], p.99

A Reaction

This seems like a neat way to sweep the problem from our sight. There remains a nervous metaphysical problem, though, because something seems to be identical when we spot a resemblance. Even two shades of red have something identical in them.

The 22 ideas from John Perry

4885 Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry]
4884 Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry]
4887 We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry]
4888 It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry]
4889 Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry]
4890 A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry]
4891 If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry]
4892 If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry]
4899 Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry]
4898 Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry]
4896 The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry]
4900 Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry]
4901 Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry]
4897 A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry]
15203 Tense is essential for thought and action [Perry, by Le Poidevin]
15204 Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context [Perry, by Le Poidevin]
12151 If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour [Perry]
12149 Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations [Perry]
18412 Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction [Perry]
12150 Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition [Perry]
16391 Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves [Perry, by Recanati]
12155 Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance [Perry]