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Full Idea
I contest the essentialist doctrine that science aims at ultimate explanations, one which cannot be further explained, and which is in no need of any further explanation.
Gist of Idea
Science does not aim at ultimate explanations
Source
Karl Popper (Conjectures and Refutations [1963], 3.3)
Book Ref
Popper,Karl: 'Conjectures and Refutations' [RKP 1965], p.105
A Reaction
If explanations are causal, this seems to a plea for an infinite regress of causes, which is an odd thing to espouse. Are the explanations verbal descriptions or things in the world. There can be no perfect descriptions, but there may be ultimate things.
| 16737 | The best explanations get down to primary basics, but others go less deep [Boyle] |
| 12737 | Nature can be fully explained by final causes alone, or by efficient causes alone [Leibniz] |
| 14873 | If we find a hypothesis that explains many things, we conclude that it explains everything [Nietzsche] |
| 12176 | Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper] |
| 3128 | It's not at all clear that explanation needs to stop anywhere [Rey] |
| 15057 | Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K] |
| 16564 | There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 14320 | Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford] |
| 14337 | Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford] |
| 14343 | To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford] |
| 15011 | If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider] |
| 14389 | There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan] |