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Single Idea 12176

[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation ]

Full Idea

I contest the essentialist doctrine that science aims at ultimate explanations, one which cannot be further explained, and which is in no need of any further explanation.

Gist of Idea

Science does not aim at ultimate explanations

Source

Karl Popper (Conjectures and Refutations [1963], 3.3)

Book Ref

Popper,Karl: 'Conjectures and Refutations' [RKP 1965], p.105

A Reaction

If explanations are causal, this seems to a plea for an infinite regress of causes, which is an odd thing to espouse. Are the explanations verbal descriptions or things in the world. There can be no perfect descriptions, but there may be ultimate things.

The 16 ideas from Karl Popper

12176 Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper]
12175 Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper]
12179 Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper]
12177 Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper]
7780 Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee]
16830 We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper]
6794 If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper]
6795 When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper]
3856 Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith]
3860 Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper]
22188 Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper]
7779 There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee]
22358 Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper]
5451 Popper felt that ancient essentialism was a bar to progress [Popper, by Mautner]
18284 Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper]
11946 Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper]