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Single Idea 12179

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism ]

Full Idea

The essentialist view of Newton (due to Roger Cotes) ...prevented fruitful questions from being raised, such as, 'What is the cause of gravity?' or 'Can we deduce Newton's theory from a more general independent theory?'

Gist of Idea

Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised

Source

Karl Popper (Conjectures and Refutations [1963], 3.3)

Book Ref

Popper,Karl: 'Conjectures and Refutations' [RKP 1965], p.106


A Reaction

This is Popper's main (and only) objection to essentialism - that it is committed to ultimate explanations, and smugly terminates science when it thinks it has found them. This does not strike me as a problem with scientific essentialism.

Related Idea

Idea 15705 Essentialism encourages us to think about the world scientifically [Gelman]


The 17 ideas with the same theme [objections to essences in scientific investigation]:

The cosmos has two elements - passive matter, and active cause (or reason) which shapes it [Stoic school, by Seneca]
The motions of the planets could only derive from an intelligent agent [Newton]
That gravity should be innate and essential to matter is absurd [Newton]
If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley]
We can never know origins, purposes or inner natures [Comte]
The limit of science is isomorphism of theories, with essences a matter of indifference [Weyl]
We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine]
Essence gives an illusion of understanding [Quine, by Almog]
Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper]
How can essences generate the right powers to vary with distance between objects? [Armstrong]
H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe]
The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg]
Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties [Psillos]
Can anything in science reveal the necessity of what it discovers? [Sidelle]
A major objection to real essences is the essentialising of social categories like race, caste and occupation [Gelman]
Defining an essence comes no where near giving a thing's nature [Almog]
Essences promise to reveal reality, but actually drive us away from it [Almog]