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Full Idea
Is there any sense in which, despite an ascription of necessity to p, it is held that not-p is possible? If there is, then the original claim then it was necessary is not a claim of 'logical' necessity (which is the strongest necessity).
Gist of Idea
It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false
Source
Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986], §1)
Book Ref
-: 'Aristotelian Society' [], p.137
A Reaction
See Idea 12181, which leads up to this proposed "test" for logical necessity. McFetridge has already put epistemic ('for all I know') possibility to one side. □p→¬◊¬p is the standard reading of necessity. His word 'sense' bears the burden.
Related Idea
Idea 12181 Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge]
15083 | The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale] |
15084 | In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale] |
12180 | Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge] |
12181 | Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge] |
12183 | It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge] |
12182 | We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge] |
12184 | Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge] |
12187 | Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge] |
12186 | Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge] |
12192 | The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge] |
18487 | We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge] |
18488 | We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge] |