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Full Idea
The geometrical style of formalization of logic is now little more than a quaint anachronism, largely because it fails to show logical truths for what they are: simply by-products of rules of inference that are applicable to suppositions.
Gist of Idea
Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths)
Source
Ian Rumfitt (Logical Necessity [2010], §1)
Book Ref
'Modality', ed/tr. Hale,B/Hoffman,A [OUP 2010], p.41
A Reaction
This is the rejection of Russell-style axiom systems in favour of Gentzen-style natural deduction systems (starting from rules). Rumfitt quotes Dummett in support.
14532 | A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
12193 | Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt] |
12194 | Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt] |
12195 | Soundness in argument varies with context, and may be achieved very informally indeed [Rumfitt] |
12198 | Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths) [Rumfitt] |
12199 | There is a modal element in consequence, in assessing reasoning from suppositions [Rumfitt] |
12201 | We reject deductions by bad consequence, so logical consequence can't be deduction [Rumfitt] |
12200 | A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt] |
12202 | Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt] |
12203 | If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt] |
12204 | The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt] |