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Full Idea
In my view, there are two independent families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other.
Gist of Idea
There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength
Source
Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], Abs)
A Reaction
My immediate reaction is that epistemic necessity is not necessity at all. 'For all I know' 2 plus 2 might really be 95, and squares may also be circular.
| 18797 | Modalities do not augment our concepts; they express their relation to cognition [Kant] |
| 12205 | There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington] |
| 14625 | Necessity is counterfactually implied by its negation; possibility does not counterfactually imply its negation [Williamson] |
| 10709 | Priority is a modality, arising from collections and members [Potter] |
| 14528 | Maybe modal thought is unavoidable, as a priori recognition of necessary truth-preservation in reasoning [Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
| 17535 | Dispositionality has its own distinctive type of modality [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14579 | Dispositionality is the core modality, with possibility and necessity as its extreme cases [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14580 | Dispositions may suggest modality to us - as what might not have been, and what could have been [Mumford/Anjum] |