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Full Idea
Metaphysical necessity derives from distinguishing things which can happen and things which can't, in virtue of their nature, which we discover empirically: the metaphysically possible, I claim, is constrained by the laws of nature.
Gist of Idea
Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature
Source
Dorothy Edgington (Two Kinds of Possibility [2004], §I)
A Reaction
She claims that Kripke is sympathetic to this. Personally I like the idea that natural necessity is metaphysically necessary (see 'Scientific Essentialism'), but the other way round comes as a bit of a surprise. I will think about it.
12207 | Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington] |
12206 | Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion [Edgington] |
12208 | An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary [Edgington] |
12205 | There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington] |