more on this theme     |     more from this text


Single Idea 12224

[filed under theme 6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique ]

Full Idea

It is claimed that neo-Fregeans are committed to 'maximalism' - that whatever can exist does.

Gist of Idea

Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist?

Source

B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §4)

Book Ref

'Metametaphysics', ed/tr. Chalmers/Manley/Wasserman [OUP 2009], p.184


A Reaction

[The cite Eklund] They observe that maximalism denies contingent non-existence (of the £20 note I haven't got). There seems to be the related problem of 'hyperinflation', that if abstract objects are generated logically, the process is unstoppable.


The 23 ideas from B Hale / C Wright

The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright]
The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright]
Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright]
Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright]
If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright]
Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright]
If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright]
The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright]
Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright]
One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright]
Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright]
The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright]
Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright]
It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright]
Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright]
Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright]
The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright]
Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright]
Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright]
Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright]
Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright]
A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright]
Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright]