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Single Idea 12242
[filed under theme 2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
]
Full Idea
To define something just means to set forth its limits in such a way that one can distinguish it from all other things of a different kind. To distinguish it from all other things of the same kind belongs to the theory of 'individuation'.
Gist of Idea
Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind
Source
David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.4)
Book Ref
Oderberg,David S.: 'Real Essentialism' [Routledge 2009], p.19
A Reaction
I take Aristotle to have included individuation as part of his understanding of definition. Are tigers a kind, or are fierce tigers a kind, and is my tiger one-of-a-kind?
The
22 ideas
from 'Real Essentialism'
12234
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Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible'
[Oderberg]
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12235
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Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence
[Oderberg]
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12237
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Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions
[Oderberg]
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12236
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Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth
[Oderberg]
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12238
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The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things
[Oderberg]
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12240
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Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects
[Oderberg]
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12239
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The real essentialist is not merely a scientist
[Oderberg]
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12243
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The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken
[Oderberg]
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12242
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Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind
[Oderberg]
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12241
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Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable
[Oderberg, by PG]
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12244
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Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences
[Oderberg]
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12245
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Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour
[Oderberg]
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12246
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What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many?
[Oderberg]
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12247
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Essence is not explanatory but constitutive
[Oderberg]
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12249
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'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference
[Oderberg]
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12250
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Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence
[Oderberg]
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12252
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Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle
[Oderberg]
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12253
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If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract?
[Oderberg]
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12254
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Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic..
[Oderberg]
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12256
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We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers
[Oderberg]
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12257
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Could we replace essence with collections of powers?
[Oderberg]
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12258
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Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it
[Oderberg]
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