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Single Idea 12245

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function ]

Full Idea

In the traditional terminology, function follows essence. Essence just is the principle from which flows the characteristic behaviour of a thing.

Gist of Idea

Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour

Source

David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 2.1)

Book Ref

Oderberg,David S.: 'Real Essentialism' [Routledge 2009], p.23


A Reaction

Hence essence must be identified if the behaviour is to be explained, and a successful identification of essence is the terminus of our explanations. But the essences must go down to the micro-level. Explain non-characteristic behaviour?


The 22 ideas from 'Real Essentialism'

Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg]
Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg]
Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg]
Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions [Oderberg]
The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things [Oderberg]
Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects [Oderberg]
The real essentialist is not merely a scientist [Oderberg]
The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg]
Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind [Oderberg]
Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [Oderberg, by PG]
Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg]
Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg]
What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? [Oderberg]
Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg]
'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference [Oderberg]
Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence [Oderberg]
Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg]
If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? [Oderberg]
Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. [Oderberg]
We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg]
Could we replace essence with collections of powers? [Oderberg]
Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it [Oderberg]