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Single Idea 12246

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One ]

Full Idea

Even if there were no multiplicity in unity - only a Parmenidean 'block' - still the question would arise as to what gave the amorphous lump its unity; by virtue of what would it be one rather than many?

Gist of Idea

What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many?

Source

David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 3.1)

Book Ref

Oderberg,David S.: 'Real Essentialism' [Routledge 2009], p.46

A Reaction

Which is prior, division or unification? If it was divided, he would ask what divided it. One of them must be primitive, so why not unity? If one big Unity is primitive, why could not lots of unities be primitive? Etc.

The 22 ideas from David S. Oderberg

12236 Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg]
12234 Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg]
12235 Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg]
12237 Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions [Oderberg]
12238 The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things [Oderberg]
12240 Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects [Oderberg]
12239 The real essentialist is not merely a scientist [Oderberg]
12243 The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg]
12242 Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind [Oderberg]
12241 Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [Oderberg, by PG]
12244 Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg]
12245 Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg]
12246 What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? [Oderberg]
12247 Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg]
12249 'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference [Oderberg]
12250 Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence [Oderberg]
12252 Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg]
12253 If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? [Oderberg]
12254 Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. [Oderberg]
12256 We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg]
12257 Could we replace essence with collections of powers? [Oderberg]
12258 Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it [Oderberg]