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Single Idea 12252

[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique ]

Full Idea

The demise of 'substance' was wholly due to mistaken notions, mainly from the empiricists, by which it was conceived either as an unknowable featureless substratum, or as dispensable in favour of some or other bundle theory.

Gist of Idea

Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle

Source

David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 4.4)

Book Ref

Oderberg,David S.: 'Real Essentialism' [Routledge 2009], p.76


A Reaction

There seems to be a view that the notion of substance is essential to explaining how we understand the world. I am inclined to think that if we accept the notion of essence we can totally dispense with the notion of substance.


The 22 ideas from 'Real Essentialism'

Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg]
Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg]
Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg]
Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions [Oderberg]
The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things [Oderberg]
Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects [Oderberg]
The real essentialist is not merely a scientist [Oderberg]
The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg]
Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind [Oderberg]
Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [Oderberg, by PG]
Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg]
Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg]
What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? [Oderberg]
Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg]
'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference [Oderberg]
Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence [Oderberg]
Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg]
If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? [Oderberg]
Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. [Oderberg]
We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg]
Could we replace essence with collections of powers? [Oderberg]
Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it [Oderberg]