more on this theme
|
more from this text
Single Idea 12254
[filed under theme 7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
]
Full Idea
Being is heterogeneous: there is substantial being, accidental being, complete being, incomplete being, necessary being, contingent being, possible being, absolute being, relative being, intrinsic being, extrinsic being, and so on.
Gist of Idea
Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic..
Source
David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 5.3)
Book Ref
Oderberg,David S.: 'Real Essentialism' [Routledge 2009], p.107
A Reaction
Dependent being? Oderberg is giving the modern scholastic view. Personally I take 'being' to be univocal, even if it can be qualified in all sorts of ways. I don't believe we actually have any grasp at all of different ways to exist.
The
22 ideas
from David S. Oderberg
12234
|
Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible'
[Oderberg]
|
12235
|
Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence
[Oderberg]
|
12237
|
Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions
[Oderberg]
|
12236
|
Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth
[Oderberg]
|
12238
|
The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things
[Oderberg]
|
12240
|
Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects
[Oderberg]
|
12239
|
The real essentialist is not merely a scientist
[Oderberg]
|
12243
|
The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken
[Oderberg]
|
12242
|
Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind
[Oderberg]
|
12241
|
Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable
[Oderberg, by PG]
|
12244
|
Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences
[Oderberg]
|
12245
|
Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour
[Oderberg]
|
12246
|
What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many?
[Oderberg]
|
12247
|
Essence is not explanatory but constitutive
[Oderberg]
|
12249
|
'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference
[Oderberg]
|
12250
|
Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence
[Oderberg]
|
12252
|
Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle
[Oderberg]
|
12253
|
If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract?
[Oderberg]
|
12254
|
Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic..
[Oderberg]
|
12256
|
We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers
[Oderberg]
|
12257
|
Could we replace essence with collections of powers?
[Oderberg]
|
12258
|
Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it
[Oderberg]
|