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Full Idea
Lewis-style modal realism eliminates all real possibility since on his account everything is actual relative to its own world.
Gist of Idea
For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual
Source
comment on David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986]) by David S. Oderberg - Real Essentialism 6.2
Book Ref
Oderberg,David S.: 'Real Essentialism' [Routledge 2009], p.127
A Reaction
Since it is possible for me to be in New York and in Chicago, but not both at once, his possibilities have to be kept apart, even though they are actual. I expect my visit to Chicago to remain as only a possibility.
| 15472 | It is pointless to say possible worlds are truthmakers, and then deny that possible worlds exist [Martin,CB] |
| 5482 | Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals [Ellis] |
| 16959 | If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett] |
| 12255 | For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual [Oderberg on Lewis] |
| 9219 | Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets [Lewis, by Sider] |
| 15022 | If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality [Sider on Lewis] |
| 10469 | A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things [Lewis] |
| 16283 | For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself [Lewis] |
| 12008 | Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G] |
| 12009 | The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G] |
| 4586 | You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology [Heil] |
| 10982 | How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read] |
| 12465 | Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs] |