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Single Idea 12256

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence ]

Full Idea

We need a theory of essence to help us distinguish between the powers that do and do not belong to the essence of a thing.

Gist of Idea

We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers

Source

David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 6.3)

Book Ref

Oderberg,David S.: 'Real Essentialism' [Routledge 2009], p.132


A Reaction

I take this to be a very good reason for searching for the essence of things, though the need to distinguish does not guarantee that there really is something to distinguish. Maybe powers just come and go. A power is essential in you but not in me?


The 24 ideas with the same theme [powers as giving the essential nature of each thing]:

The hidden harmony is stronger than the visible [Heraclitus]
Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle]
Giving the function of a house defines its actuality [Aristotle]
The essence of a thing is its effort to persevere [Spinoza]
What is the texture - the real essence - which makes substances behave in distinct ways? [Locke]
The question is whether force is self-sufficient in bodies, and essential, or dependent on something [Lenfant]
The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting [Leibniz]
Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz]
My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz]
I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz]
Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz]
There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz]
Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz]
Essence is primitive force, or a law of change [Leibniz]
Forms have sensation and appetite, the latter being the ability to act on other bodies [Leibniz, by Garber]
The essence of a thing is its real possibilities [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity [Wiggins]
The possible Aristotelian view that forms are real and active principles is clearly wrong [Fine,K, by Pasnau]
If properties are powers, then causal relations are internal relations [Heil]
We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg]
There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau]
Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter]
A power is a property which consists entirely of dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
Powers are qualitative properties which fully ground dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]