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Single Idea 12256
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
]
Full Idea
We need a theory of essence to help us distinguish between the powers that do and do not belong to the essence of a thing.
Gist of Idea
We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers
Source
David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 6.3)
Book Ref
Oderberg,David S.: 'Real Essentialism' [Routledge 2009], p.132
A Reaction
I take this to be a very good reason for searching for the essence of things, though the need to distinguish does not guarantee that there really is something to distinguish. Maybe powers just come and go. A power is essential in you but not in me?
The
22 ideas
from 'Real Essentialism'
12234
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Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible'
[Oderberg]
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12235
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Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence
[Oderberg]
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12237
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Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions
[Oderberg]
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12236
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Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth
[Oderberg]
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12238
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The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things
[Oderberg]
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12240
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Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects
[Oderberg]
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12239
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The real essentialist is not merely a scientist
[Oderberg]
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12243
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The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken
[Oderberg]
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12242
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Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind
[Oderberg]
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12241
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Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable
[Oderberg, by PG]
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12244
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Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences
[Oderberg]
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12245
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Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour
[Oderberg]
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12246
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What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many?
[Oderberg]
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12247
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Essence is not explanatory but constitutive
[Oderberg]
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12249
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'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference
[Oderberg]
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12250
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Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence
[Oderberg]
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12252
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Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle
[Oderberg]
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12253
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If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract?
[Oderberg]
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12254
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Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic..
[Oderberg]
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12256
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We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers
[Oderberg]
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12257
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Could we replace essence with collections of powers?
[Oderberg]
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12258
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Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it
[Oderberg]
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