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Full Idea
'The same' is employed in several senses: its principal sense is for same name or same definition; a second sense occurs when sameness is applied to a property [idiu]; a third sense is applied to an accident.
Gist of Idea
'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents
Source
Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103a24-33)
Book Ref
Aristotle: 'Posterior Analytics and Topica', ed/tr. Tredennick,H/Forster,ES [Harvard 1960], p.291
A Reaction
[compressed] 'Property' is better translated as 'proprium' - a property unique to a particular thing, but not essential - see Idea 12262. Things are made up of essence, propria and accidents, and three ways of being 'the same' are the result.
Related Idea
Idea 12262 An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle]
| 12266 | 'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle] |
| 12287 | Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle] |
| 12288 | Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle] |
| 8650 | Things are the same if one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth [Leibniz] |
| 21315 | A tree remains the same in the popular sense, but not in the strict philosophical sense [Butler] |
| 15826 | There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ [Chisholm] |
| 11910 | Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X' [Geach] |
| 16999 | A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke] |
| 16494 | We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative [Wiggins] |