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Full Idea
Things which are the same specifically or generically are not necessarily the same or cannot possibly be the same numerically.
Gist of Idea
Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same
Source
Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 152b32)
Book Ref
Aristotle: 'Posterior Analytics and Topica', ed/tr. Tredennick,H/Forster,ES [Harvard 1960], p.655
A Reaction
See also Idea 12266. This looks to me to be a pretty precise anticipation of Peirce's type/token distinction, but without the terminology. It is reassuring that Aristotle spotted it, as that makes it more likely to be a genuine distinction.
Related Idea
Idea 12266 'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle]
12266 | 'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle] |
12287 | Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle] |
12288 | Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle] |
8650 | Things are the same if one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth [Leibniz] |
21315 | A tree remains the same in the popular sense, but not in the strict philosophical sense [Butler] |
15826 | There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ [Chisholm] |
11910 | Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X' [Geach] |
16999 | A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke] |
16494 | We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative [Wiggins] |