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Single Idea 12301

[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object ]

Full Idea

Everything has a sort of matter [hule], provided only that it is not a what-it-was-to-be-that-thing [ti en einai] and a per se Form Itself [eidos auto kath' auto] but a possessor of thisness [tode ti].

Gist of Idea

Every distinct thing has matter, as long as it isn't an essence or a Form

Source

Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1037a01)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Metaphysics', ed/tr. Lawson-Tancred,Hugh [Penguin 1998], p.208


A Reaction

Kit Fine quotes this to support the claim that Aristotelian 'matter' is not confined to physical objects. Aristotle's essence is the form which imposes identity on the matter.

Related Idea

Idea 12300 Aristotle's conception of matter applies to non-physical objects as well as physical objects [Aristotle, by Fine,K]


The 13 ideas with the same theme [underlying material which is formed into an object]:

Matter is the substratum, which supports both coming-to-be and alteration [Aristotle]
Every distinct thing has matter, as long as it isn't an essence or a Form [Aristotle]
In Aristotle, bronze only becomes 'matter' when it is potentially a statue [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Aristotle's conception of matter applies to non-physical objects as well as physical objects [Aristotle, by Fine,K]
Aristotle's matter is something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour [Aristotle, by Witt]
Matter is secondary, because it is potential, determined by the actuality of form [Aristotle, by Witt]
In feature-generation the matter (such as bronze) endures, but in generation it doesn't [Aristotle, by Politis]
The ultimate material of things has the unity of total formlessness [Avicenna]
The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies [Harré/Madden]
Matter underlies things, composes things, and brings them to be [Wiggins]
I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples' [Inwagen]
Aristotelian matter seriously threatens the intrinsic unity and substantiality of its object [Gill,ML]
The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]