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Single Idea 12309

[filed under theme 14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration ]

Full Idea

It is not even possible for there to be a science of the accidental, ...for any field of science is either 'always' or 'for the most part'.

Gist of Idea

There cannot be a science of accidentals, but only of general truths

Source

Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1065b30-)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Metaphysics', ed/tr. Lawson-Tancred,Hugh [Penguin 1998], p.336


A Reaction

His example of an accident (and thus outside of any science) is a cold spell in high summer. This leaves us trying to explain the unusually tame tiger. Copi comments (p.717), rightly I think, that modern science disagrees with Aristotle on this.

Related Idea

Idea 12310 Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi]


The 27 ideas with the same theme [proving physical facts by observation and reason]:

Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties [Aristotle]
Demonstrations move from starting-points to deduced conclusions [Aristotle]
There cannot be a science of accidentals, but only of general truths [Aristotle]
Demonstrations about particulars must be about everything of that type [Aristotle]
Demonstration is more than entailment, as the explanatory order must match the causal order [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Aristotle gets asymmetric consequence from demonstration, which reflects real causal priority [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Aristotle doesn't actually apply his theory of demonstration to his practical science [Leroi on Aristotle]
We can know by demonstration, which is a scientific deduction leading to understanding [Aristotle]
Premises must be true, primitive and immediate, and prior to and explanatory of conclusions [Aristotle]
A demonstration is a deduction which proceeds from necessities [Aristotle]
Demonstrative understanding rests on necessary features of the thing in itself [Aristotle]
Demonstrations must be necessary, and that depends on the middle term [Aristotle]
All demonstration is concerned with existence, axioms and properties [Aristotle]
Demonstrations are syllogisms which give explanations [Aristotle]
Universal demonstrations are about thought; particular demonstrations lead to perceptions [Aristotle]
Demonstration is better with fewer presuppositions, and it is quicker if these are familiar [Aristotle]
The principles of demonstrations are definitions [Aristotle]
There must be definitions before demonstration is possible [Aristotle]
Aim to get definitions of the primitive components, thus establishing the kind, and work towards the attributes [Aristotle]
Demonstration derives what is less clear from what is clear [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan]
If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce]
Inductive inference is not proof, but weighing evidence and probability [Lipton]
We infer from evidence by working out what would explain that evidence [Lipton]
Demonstration provides depth of understanding and explanation (rather than foundations) [Kretzmann/Stump]
In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena [Koslicki]
In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition [Koslicki]