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Full Idea
Contrary to Locke, I should hold that real essences are in principle knowable, and contrary to Aristotle, I should hold that non-essential or accidental properties can also be objects of scientific knowledge.
Gist of Idea
Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties
Source
Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.717)
Book Ref
-: 'Journal of Philosophy' [-], p.717
A Reaction
Copi has just become my hero. Aristotle's account of definition is on the brink of allowing fine-tuned essences, but he thinks universal understanding blocks knowledge of individuals. But cross-referencing of universals pinpoints individuals.
Related Idea
Idea 12309 There cannot be a science of accidentals, but only of general truths [Aristotle]
10937 | Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami] |
12303 | Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi] |
12307 | Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi] |
12308 | In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi] |
12310 | Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi] |
12312 | The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi] |