more from this thinker     |     more from this text

Single Idea 12350

[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined ]

Full Idea

It is because the primary substances are subjects for everything else that they are called substances [ousiai] most strictly.

Gist of Idea

Things are called 'substances' because they are subjects for everything else

Source

Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 03a04)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Categories and De Interpretatione', ed/tr. Ackrill,J.R. [OUP 1963], p.8

A Reaction

This points to a rather minimal account of substance, as possibly the 'bare particular' which has no other role than to have properties. This expands in 'Metaphysics' to be matter which has form, making properties possible.

The 37 ideas with the same theme [attempts to define what a substance consists of]:

598 Democritus said that substances could never be mixed, so atoms are the substances [Democritus, by Aristotle]
8287 Earlier Aristotle had objects as primary substances, but later he switched to substantial form [Aristotle, by Lowe]
12350 Things are called 'substances' because they are subjects for everything else [Aristotle]
11299 Substance [ousia] is the subject of predication and cause [aitia?] of something's existence [Aristotle]
12060 Essence (fixed by definition) is also 'ousia', so 'ousia' is both ultimate subject, and a this-thing [Aristotle]
10941 A substance is what-it-is-to-be, or the universal, or the genus, or the subject of saying [Aristotle]
595 It is matter that turns out to be substance [ousia] [Aristotle]
11290 Matter is not substance, because substance needs separability and thisness [Aristotle]
10959 The substance is the form dwelling in the object [Aristotle]
12093 Substance is unified and universals are diverse, so universals are not substance [Aristotle, by Witt]
12362 A thing's substance is its primary cause of being [Aristotle]
607 None of the universals can be a substance [Aristotle]
11233 In Aristotle, 'proté ousia' is 'primary being', and 'to hupokeimenon' is 'that which lies under' (or 'substance') [Aristotle, by Politis]
12079 Substance is distinct being because of its unity [Aristotle, by Witt]
5013 A substance needs nothing else in order to exist [Descartes]
4813 Substance is that of which an independent conception can be formed [Spinoza]
21857 Substance is the power of self-actualisation [Spinoza, by Lord]
7945 We think of substance as experienced qualities plus a presumed substratum of support [Locke]
12712 Substance is that which can act [Leibniz]
12756 Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz]
11855 Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence [Leibniz]
13091 Leibnizian substances add concept, law, force, form and soul [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
7561 Substances are essentially active [Leibniz, by Jolley]
3959 There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit [Berkeley]
6729 Material substance is just general existence which can have properties [Berkeley]
21451 All appearances need substance, as that which persists through change [Kant]
5564 Substance must exist, as the persisting substratum of the process of change [Kant]
22628 Substance has to exist, with no intrinsic qualities or relations [McTaggart]
12047 We refer to persisting substances, in perception and in thought, and they aid understanding [Wiggins]
7712 On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
16128 A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects [Lowe]
13069 The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
12358 Substance is a principle and a kind of cause [Wedin]
7930 The bundle theory of substance implies the identity of indiscernibles [Macdonald,C]
19347 Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins]
15391 A substance is, roughly, a basic being or subject at the foundation of reality [Robb]
18865 Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant]