more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 12359
[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
]
Full Idea
Although what-is-it [ti esti] questions serve the classificatory project in 'Categories', they are no help in the causal enquiries of 'Metaphysics' Z.17. The essence of interest can't be the species or the differentia-cum-genus complex.
Gist of Idea
'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence
Source
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1041a05-b36) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance X.4
Book Ref
Wedin,Michael V.: 'Aristotle's Theory of Substance' [OUP 2000], p.421
A Reaction
Wedin's view is that these are compatible. The implication is that the nature of essence depends entirely on what it is you want to explain. Explain the category, or explain the behaviour?
The
18 ideas
with the same theme
[essence for animals is the species they belong to]:
16106
|
Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter
[Aristotle]
|
16144
|
Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species
[Aristotle]
|
12359
|
'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence
[Aristotle, by Wedin]
|
12068
|
Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
16141
|
In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
16149
|
Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing
[Aristotle]
|
13434
|
In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species
[Locke]
|
16035
|
If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles
[Locke]
|
16036
|
Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five?
[Locke]
|
12987
|
For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member
[Leibniz]
|
12906
|
Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists
[Leibniz]
|
16955
|
Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent
[Kripke, by Dummett]
|
16996
|
Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge
[Kripke]
|
17370
|
Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences
[Devitt]
|
17368
|
Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category
[Devitt]
|
17389
|
A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one
[Dupré]
|
17388
|
It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds
[Dupré]
|
17870
|
Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers
[Almog]
|