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Single Idea 12361

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory ]

Full Idea

The primacy of 'Categories' primary substances is a kind of ontological primacy, whereas the primacy of form is a kind of structural or explanatory primacy.

Gist of Idea

Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics'

Source

report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance X.9

Book Ref

Wedin,Michael V.: 'Aristotle's Theory of Substance' [OUP 2000], p.453


A Reaction

'Structural' and 'explanatory' sound very different, since the former sounds ontological and the latter epistemological (and more subjective).


The 21 ideas with the same theme [essence is what intrinsically explains a thing]:

Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Metaphysics is the science of ultimate explanation, or of pure existence, or of primary existence [Aristotle, by Politis]
The four explanations are the main aspects of a thing's nature [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
A thing's nature is what causes its changes and stability [Aristotle]
Aristotelian essences are properties mentioned at the starting point of a science [Aristotle, by Kung]
All natures of things produce some effect [Spinoza]
Explanatory essence won't do, because it won't distinguish the accidental from the essential [Locke, by Pasnau]
If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz]
Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami]
Aristotelian essences underlie a thing's existence, explain it, and must belong to it [Kung]
Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody]
Essences are not explanations, but individuations [Wiggins]
The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen]
Essences mainly explain the existence of unified substance [Witt]
Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré]
An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami]
Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe]
All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe]
Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg]
Being a deepest explanatory feature is an actual, not a modal property [Sidelle]
The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]