more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 12375

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds ]

Full Idea

In each kind, whatever holds of something in itself and as such holds of it from necessity.

Gist of Idea

Whatever holds of a kind intrinsically holds of it necessarily

Source

Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 75a30)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Posterior Analytics (2nd ed)', ed/tr. Barnes,Jonathan [OUP 1993], p.12


A Reaction

This seems to confirm the view that essential properties are necessary, but it does not, of course, follow that all necessary properties are essential properties (e.g. trivial necessities are not essential).


The 7 ideas with the same theme [natural kinds in some way have to be as they are]:

Whatever holds of a kind intrinsically holds of it necessarily [Aristotle]
For essentialists two members of a natural kind must be identical [Ellis]
The whole of our world is a natural kind, so all worlds like it necessarily have the same laws [Ellis]
Gold's atomic number might not be 79, but if it is, could non-79 stuff be gold? [Kripke]
'Cats are animals' has turned out to be a necessary truth [Kripke]
We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity [Harré/Madden]
Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P]