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Single Idea 12413

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues ]

Full Idea

A 'warrant' refers to those processes which produce belief 'in the right way': X knows that p iff p, and X believes that p, and X's belief that p was produced by a process which is a warrant for it.

Gist of Idea

A 'warrant' is a process which ensures that a true belief is knowledge

Source

Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 01.2)

Book Ref

Kitcher,Philip: 'The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge' [OUP 1984], p.17


A Reaction

That is, a 'warrant' is a justification which makes a belief acceptable as knowledge. Traditionally, warrants give you certainty (and are, consequently, rather hard to find). I would say, in the modern way, that warrants are agreed by social convention.


The 15 ideas with the same theme [areas of interest concerning justification]:

If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson]
Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle]
Must all justification be inferential? [Ginet]
Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion [Ginet]
A 'warrant' is a process which ensures that a true belief is knowledge [Kitcher]
Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M]
Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz]
Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske]
Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered [Williamson]
Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification [O'Grady]
The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge [Merricks]
Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew]
Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid]
'Modal epistemology' demands a connection between the belief and facts in possible worlds [Black,T]