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Full Idea
We must distinguish between explaining particular necessities and explaining necessity in general; and we ought to distinguish between explaining, in regard to any necessary truth, why it is true, and explaining why it is necessary.
Gist of Idea
Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary?
Source
Bob Hale (The Source of Necessity [2002], p.308)
Book Ref
-: 'Philosophical Perspectives' [-], p.308
A Reaction
Useful. The pluralist view I associate with Fine says we can explain types of necessity, but not necessity in general. If we seek truthmakers, there is a special case of what adds the necessity to the truth.
| 12432 | Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale] |
| 12433 | If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale] |
| 12434 | Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale] |
| 12435 | The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale] |
| 12436 | Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale] |