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Single Idea 12439

[filed under theme 3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth ]

Full Idea

No truth predicate is ever indispensable, because Tarski biconditionals, the equivalences between sentences and explicit truth ascriptions to those sentences, allow us to replace explicit truth ascriptions with the sentences themselves.

Clarification

E.g. 'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white

Gist of Idea

Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself

Source

Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.1)

Book Ref

Azzouni,Jody: 'Deflating Existential Consequence' [OUP 2004], p.16


A Reaction

Holding a sentence to be true isn't the same as saying that it is true, and it isn't the same as saying the sentence, because one might say it in an ironic tone of voice.


The 13 ideas with the same theme [truth is an unnecessary meaningless concept]:

That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce]
The property of truth in 'It is true that I smell violets' adds nothing to 'I smell violets' [Frege]
"The death of Caesar is true" is not the same proposition as "Caesar died" [Russell]
"It is true that x" means no more than x [Ramsey]
Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski]
'It is true that this follows' means simply: this follows [Wittgenstein]
Truth is redundant for single sentences; we do better to simply speak the sentence [Quine]
Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement [Putnam]
Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson]
The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich]
Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni]
'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely' [Hofweber]
The redundancy theory conflates metalinguistic bivalence with object-language excluded middle [Bourne]