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Full Idea
No truth predicate is ever indispensable, because Tarski biconditionals, the equivalences between sentences and explicit truth ascriptions to those sentences, allow us to replace explicit truth ascriptions with the sentences themselves.
Clarification
E.g. 'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white
Gist of Idea
Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself
Source
Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.1)
Book Ref
Azzouni,Jody: 'Deflating Existential Consequence' [OUP 2004], p.16
A Reaction
Holding a sentence to be true isn't the same as saying that it is true, and it isn't the same as saying the sentence, because one might say it in an ironic tone of voice.
| 12437 | Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni] |
| 12438 | In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni] |
| 12439 | Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni] |
| 12442 | 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni] |
| 12445 | If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni] |
| 12441 | We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni] |
| 12440 | If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni] |
| 12446 | Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni] |
| 12448 | Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni] |
| 12447 | That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni] |
| 12449 | Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni] |
| 12450 | The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni] |