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Full Idea
No truth predicate is ever indispensable, because Tarski biconditionals, the equivalences between sentences and explicit truth ascriptions to those sentences, allow us to replace explicit truth ascriptions with the sentences themselves.
Clarification
E.g. 'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white
Gist of Idea
Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself
Source
Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.1)
Book Ref
Azzouni,Jody: 'Deflating Existential Consequence' [OUP 2004], p.16
A Reaction
Holding a sentence to be true isn't the same as saying that it is true, and it isn't the same as saying the sentence, because one might say it in an ironic tone of voice.
| 12438 | In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni] |
| 12437 | Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni] |
| 12439 | Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni] |
| 12442 | 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni] |
| 12441 | We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni] |
| 12445 | If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni] |
| 12440 | If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni] |
| 12446 | Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni] |
| 12447 | That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni] |
| 12448 | Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni] |
| 12450 | The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni] |
| 12449 | Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni] |