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Single Idea 12442
[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
]
Full Idea
'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' can be taken as true without have any truthmaker.
Gist of Idea
'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker
Source
Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.3)
Book Ref
Azzouni,Jody: 'Deflating Existential Consequence' [OUP 2004], p.57
A Reaction
There might be an equivocation over 'true' here. 'What, really really true that he IS a fictional mouse?'
The
15 ideas
with the same theme
[opposing the claim that all truths have truthmakers]:
19044
|
Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true
[Davidson]
|
10750
|
Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker
[Oliver]
|
9140
|
Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'?
[Sorensen]
|
14024
|
Truthmaker has problems with generalisation, non-existence claims, and property instantiations
[Crisp,TM]
|
14412
|
Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false
[Merricks]
|
14414
|
I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me?
[Merricks]
|
12442
|
'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker
[Azzouni]
|
18474
|
Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have
[MacBride]
|
18485
|
Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent
[MacBride]
|
18490
|
Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'?
[MacBride]
|
18493
|
Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification
[MacBride]
|
17318
|
Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths?
[Liggins]
|
14480
|
Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world
[Thomasson]
|
18863
|
What is the truthmaker for a possible new power?
[Tallant]
|
19079
|
For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct
[Young,JO]
|