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Single Idea 12445

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism ]

Full Idea

It's robustly part of common sense that fictional objects don't exist in any sense at all, and this means they aren't abstracta either.

Gist of Idea

If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects

Source

Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.3)

Book Ref

Azzouni,Jody: 'Deflating Existential Consequence' [OUP 2004], p.72


A Reaction

Nice. It is so easy to have some philosopher dilute and equivocate over the word 'object' until you find yourself committed to all sorts of daft things as somehow having objectual existence. We can discuss things which don't exist in any way at all.


The 12 ideas with the same theme [much of ontology is actually convenient fictions we create]:

Classes are logical fictions, made from defining characteristics [Russell]
Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong]
Abstractions may well be verbal fictions, in which we ignore some features of an object [Lewis]
Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes]
We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo]
Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts [Yablo]
For me, fictions are internally true, without a significant internal or external truth-value [Yablo]
Make-believe can help us to reason about facts and scientific procedures [Yablo]
'The clouds are angry' can only mean '...if one were attributing emotions to clouds' [Yablo]
Fictionalism eschews the abstract, but it still needs the possible (without model theory) [Shapiro]
Structuralism blurs the distinction between mathematical and ordinary objects [Shapiro]
If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni]