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Full Idea
It's robustly part of common sense that fictional objects don't exist in any sense at all, and this means they aren't abstracta either.
Gist of Idea
If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects
Source
Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.3)
Book Ref
Azzouni,Jody: 'Deflating Existential Consequence' [OUP 2004], p.72
A Reaction
Nice. It is so easy to have some philosopher dilute and equivocate over the word 'object' until you find yourself committed to all sorts of daft things as somehow having objectual existence. We can discuss things which don't exist in any way at all.
| 12437 | Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni] |
| 12438 | In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni] |
| 12439 | Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni] |
| 12442 | 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni] |
| 12445 | If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni] |
| 12441 | We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni] |
| 12440 | If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni] |
| 12446 | Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni] |
| 12448 | Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni] |
| 12447 | That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni] |
| 12449 | Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni] |
| 12450 | The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni] |