more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
Names function the same way (semantically and grammatically) regardless of whether or not there's an object that they refer to.
Gist of Idea
Names function the same way, even if there is no object
Source
Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.3 n55)
Book Ref
Azzouni,Jody: 'Deflating Existential Consequence' [OUP 2004], p.79
A Reaction
I take this to be a fairly clear rebuttal of the 'Fido'-Fido view of names (that the meaning of the name IS the dog), which never seems to quite go away. A name is a peg on which description may be hung, seems a good slogan to me.
| 18937 | If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer] |
| 18940 | It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege] |
| 18939 | In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege] |
| 6439 | Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell] |
| 18943 | Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell] |
| 10426 | A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell] |
| 13361 | An expression is only a name if it succeeds in referring to a real object [Bostock] |
| 10429 | It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury] |
| 19001 | 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo] |
| 12446 | Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni] |
| 18946 | Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer] |
| 18934 | Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer] |
| 18938 | Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer] |