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Full Idea
If the argument isn't that, metaphysically speaking, anything that exists must have causal powers - how on earth would we show that? - rather, the claim is an epistemic one. Any thing we're in a position to know about we must causally interact with.
Gist of Idea
That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one
Source
Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.4)
Book Ref
Azzouni,Jody: 'Deflating Existential Consequence' [OUP 2004], p.83
A Reaction
A very good point. I am attracted to causal power as a criterion for existence, but Azzouni's distinction is vital. Maybe there is just no point in even talking about things which exist but have no causal powers.
| 12437 | Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni] |
| 12438 | In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni] |
| 12439 | Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni] |
| 12442 | 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni] |
| 12445 | If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni] |
| 12441 | We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni] |
| 12440 | If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni] |
| 12446 | Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni] |
| 12448 | Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni] |
| 12447 | That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni] |
| 12449 | Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni] |
| 12450 | The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni] |