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Single Idea 12465

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism ]

Full Idea

Lewis's concrete worlds give a better account of modality (than fictional worlds). When I learn that a man like me drives a truck, I gain evidence for the fact that I can drive a truck.

Gist of Idea

Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be

Source

Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §3)

Book Ref

-: 'Philosophical Studies' [-], p.7


A Reaction

Cf. Idea 12464. Jacobs still rightly rejects this as an account of possibility, since the possibility that I might drive a truck must be rooted in me, not in some other person who drives a truck, even if that person is very like me.

Related Idea

Idea 12464 If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs]


The 13 ideas with the same theme [proposal that possible worlds really exist]:

It is pointless to say possible worlds are truthmakers, and then deny that possible worlds exist [Martin,CB]
Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals [Ellis]
If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett]
For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual [Oderberg on Lewis]
Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets [Lewis, by Sider]
If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality [Sider on Lewis]
A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things [Lewis]
For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself [Lewis]
Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G]
The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G]
You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology [Heil]
How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read]
Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs]