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Single Idea 12504

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity ]

Full Idea

We don't conceive it possible that two things of the same kind should exist in the same place and time...When, therefore, we demand whether any thing be the same or no, it refers to something that existed at a time and place, and was the same with itself.

Gist of Idea

Two things can't occupy one place and time, which leads us to the idea of self-identity

Source

John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.27.01)

Book Ref

Locke,John: 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding', ed/tr. Nidditch,P.H. [OUP 1979], p.328


A Reaction

I find the notion of 'self-identity' puzzling. I've always taken it to be a logicians' idea, but Locke seems to arrive at it by looking for whatever is identical with some original object, and the floating relation having to hook back onto itself.


The 23 ideas with the same theme [relation of identity holding between a thing and itself]:

Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic [Benardete,JA on Aristotle]
We can't understand self-identity without a prior grasp of the object [Aristotle]
You are one with yourself in form and matter [Aristotle]
Two things can't occupy one place and time, which leads us to the idea of self-identity [Locke]
Everything is what it is, and not another thing [Butler]
'An object is the same with itself' is meaningless; it expresses unity, not identity [Hume]
Saying an object is the same with itself is only meaningful over a period of time [Hume]
Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept [Wittgenstein]
The 'property' of self-identity is uselessly tautological [Black]
The property of being identical with me is an individual concept [Chisholm]
A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver]
The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong]
A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke]
Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
If non-existent things are self-identical, they are just one thing - so call it the 'null object' [Bostock]
Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing [Lewis]
Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn]
Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn]
Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself? [Benardete,JA]
Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent [Benardete,JA]
Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K]
If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K]