more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 12513
[filed under theme 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
]
Full Idea
Should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the prince's past life, enter the body of a cobbler, everyone sees he would be the same person with the prince, accountable for the prince's actions. But who would say he is the same man?
Gist of Idea
If a prince's soul entered a cobbler's body, the person would be the prince (and the man the cobbler)
Source
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.27.15)
Book Ref
Locke,John: 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding', ed/tr. Nidditch,P.H. [OUP 1979], p.340
A Reaction
This is another case of conceivability being misleading about possibility. I take this transfer to be utterly (metaphysically) impossible, and hence not a good 'intuition-pump' for assessing what personal identity means.
The
22 ideas
with the same theme
[Self as the continuity of our conscious existence]:
1650
|
For Socrates our soul, though hard to define, is our self
[Vlastos on Socrates]
|
21828
|
A person is the whole of their soul
[Plotinus]
|
5511
|
For Locke, conscious awareness unifies a person at an instant and over time
[Locke, by Martin/Barresi]
|
12509
|
If the soul individuates a man, and souls are transferable, then a hog could be a man
[Locke]
|
1376
|
Identity must be in consciousness not substance, because it seems transferable
[Locke]
|
12512
|
If someone becomes conscious of Nestor's actions, then he is Nestor
[Locke]
|
12513
|
If a prince's soul entered a cobbler's body, the person would be the prince (and the man the cobbler)
[Locke]
|
12514
|
On Judgement Day, no one will be punished for actions they cannot remember
[Locke]
|
1397
|
Locke sees underlying substance as irrelevant to personal identity
[Locke, by Noonan]
|
12973
|
We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps
[Leibniz]
|
21306
|
Causation unites our perceptions, by producing, destroying and modifying each other
[Hume]
|
21311
|
Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes?
[Hume]
|
7546
|
A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation
[Russell]
|
7946
|
The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things
[Williams,B, by Macdonald,C]
|
1393
|
One of my future selves will not necessarily be me
[Parfit]
|
5521
|
If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity
[Parfit]
|
5522
|
Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity
[Parfit]
|
5351
|
We only have a sense of our self as continuous, not as exactly the same
[Flanagan]
|
23547
|
It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival
[Fine,K]
|
5503
|
Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice
[Martin/Barresi]
|
5504
|
Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant
[Martin/Barresi]
|
7947
|
In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself
[Macdonald,C]
|