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Single Idea 12514
[filed under theme 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
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Full Idea
In the Great Day, wherein the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open, it may be reasonable to think no one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of.
Gist of Idea
On Judgement Day, no one will be punished for actions they cannot remember
Source
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.27.22)
Book Ref
Locke,John: 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding', ed/tr. Nidditch,P.H. [OUP 1979], p.344
A Reaction
If you could persuade devout criminals of the truth of Locke's idea, you could make a fortune selling them 'forgetfulness pills', which guaranteed they couldn't remember a thing on Judgement Day. Or perhaps that's what marihuana does.
The
22 ideas
with the same theme
[Self as the continuity of our conscious existence]:
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1650
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For Socrates our soul, though hard to define, is our self
[Vlastos on Socrates]
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21828
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A person is the whole of their soul
[Plotinus]
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5511
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For Locke, conscious awareness unifies a person at an instant and over time
[Locke, by Martin/Barresi]
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12509
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If the soul individuates a man, and souls are transferable, then a hog could be a man
[Locke]
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1376
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Identity must be in consciousness not substance, because it seems transferable
[Locke]
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12512
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If someone becomes conscious of Nestor's actions, then he is Nestor
[Locke]
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12513
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If a prince's soul entered a cobbler's body, the person would be the prince (and the man the cobbler)
[Locke]
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12514
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On Judgement Day, no one will be punished for actions they cannot remember
[Locke]
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1397
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Locke sees underlying substance as irrelevant to personal identity
[Locke, by Noonan]
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12973
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We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps
[Leibniz]
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21306
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Causation unites our perceptions, by producing, destroying and modifying each other
[Hume]
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21311
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Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes?
[Hume]
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7546
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A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation
[Russell]
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7946
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The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things
[Williams,B, by Macdonald,C]
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1393
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One of my future selves will not necessarily be me
[Parfit]
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5521
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If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity
[Parfit]
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5522
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Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity
[Parfit]
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5351
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We only have a sense of our self as continuous, not as exactly the same
[Flanagan]
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23547
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It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival
[Fine,K]
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5504
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Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant
[Martin/Barresi]
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5503
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Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice
[Martin/Barresi]
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7947
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In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself
[Macdonald,C]
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