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Single Idea 12516

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance ]

Full Idea

The cause of obscurity in simple ideas seems to be either dull organs, or very slight and transient impressions made by the objects, or else a weakness in memory, not able to retain them as received.

Gist of Idea

Obscure simple ideas result from poor senses, brief impressions, or poor memory

Source

John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.29.03)

Book Ref

Locke,John: 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding', ed/tr. Nidditch,P.H. [OUP 1979], p.363


A Reaction

This seems to give some support to the epistemological view of vagueness, with the implication that if our senses and memory were perfect, then our ideas would have perfect clarity.


The 14 ideas with the same theme [vagueness arising from our imprecise knowledge]:

Obscure simple ideas result from poor senses, brief impressions, or poor memory [Locke]
Ideas are uncertain when they are unnamed, because too close to other ideas [Locke]
Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K]
If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith]
The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith]
The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith]
Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson]
Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which [Williamson]
If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is [Williamson]
The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance [Williamson]
If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use [Williamson]
Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts [Williamson]
Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons [Hawley]
Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen]